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Transition economies like Russia lack properly functioning financial markets and institu-
tions, which results in severe agency and information problems. Business groups in such 
markets have the potential to offer benefits to member firms, but they also may destroy 
value. Using a unique database on membership in Russian business groups, we analyze the 
relationship between group affiliation and firm performance on the basis of a large panel of 
manufacturing firms for the period 1999-2002. We find that group membership has a posi-
tive effect on productive efficiency, but gains from improved productivity in group affili-
ates do not adequately translate into higher profitability. This is consistent with the expro-
priation hypothesis, according to which controlling owners of groups extract private bene-
fits by siphoning profits from their members. Among the different group categories deli-
neated by type of controlling owner, the extent of profit dissipation is especially large in 
groups controlled by private domestic owners, who face a greater risk of possible future 
expropriation of property. Finally, we examine two potential sources of benefits of mem-
bership in business groups: mutual insurance among affiliated firms and preferential treat-
ment from the state via subsidies and tolerated tax arrears. We find that, during the period 
studied, groups neither provided mutual insurance nor did they receive larger support from 
the state than unaffiliated firms. Together with findings from the previous literature indi-
cating that, prior to the 1998 financial crisis, group firms benefited from more efficient al-
location of capital within groups than in the rest of the economy but not after the crisis, our 
results suggest that the advantages of group membership recede as the economic and insti-
tutional environment gradually improves. 
 
Keywords: business groups, firm performance, transition economy, Russia 
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Venäjän kaltaisissa siirtymätalouksissa ei ole kunnolla toimivia rahoitusmarkkinoita eikä 
taloudellista toimintaa sääteleviä instituutioita. Tämä pahentaa epäsymmetrisen informaa-
tion aiheuttamia ongelmia yritysten toiminnassa. Tällaisessa taloudessa jäsenyys yrity-
sryhmässä voi tarjota yritykselle sekä etuja että haittoja. Tässä työssä tutkitaan yrity-
sryhmäjäsenyyden vaikutusta yritysten suorituskykyyn ainutlaatuisella tietokannalla, jossa 
on tietoja monista venäläisistä tehdasteollisuuden yrityksistä vuosien 1999 ja 2002 välillä. 
Tulosten mukaan jäsenyys yritysryhmässä lisää tuottavuutta, mutta parempi tuottavuus ei 
näy suurempina voittoina. Tämä tulos viittaa siihen, että omistajat, jotka pystyvät vaikut-
tamaan yritysten toimintaan, saavat kontrolloimistaan yrityksistä yksityistä hyötyä, mikä 
vähentää yritysten voitollisuutta. Tämä efekti on erityisen selvä tapauksissa, joissa kontrol-
loiva omistaja on yksityinen yritys. Työssä tutkitaan myös niitä mahdollisia hyötyjä, joita 
jäsenyydestä yritysryhmässä voi olla. Yritysryhmä voi olla eräänlainen vakuutuksen muo-
to, ja viranomaiset saattavat suosia yritysryhmän jäseniä esimerkiksi tukien ja verorästien 
sallimisen kautta. Tutkittuna ajanjaksona näitä positiivisia vaikutuksia ei kuitenkaan voitu 
havaita. Tämä sekä aiemmat tutkimustulokset antavat aiheen olettaa, että ennen vuoden 
1998 talouskriisiä yritysryhmien sisäiset pääomamarkkinat tehostivat yritysten toimintaa, 
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1  Introduction 
Business groups of various kinds and organizational structures are a prominent feature of 
the landscape of most emerging markets and of some developed economies as well, where 
they often control a substantial part of a country’s productive assets (Khanna and Ghema-
wat (1998), Khanna and Yafeh (2007)). Given their ubiquity, diversified groups and the 
role of group affiliation have been the subject of much analytical analysis and empirical 
investigation. Among the range of research topics, two focal questions emerge in the litera-
ture on groups: How does business group affiliation affect firm valuation and perfor-
mance? If there are significant effects, what are the sources of the costs or benefits? 
In the context of developed economies (such as US and UK), there is wide agree-
ment among empirical economists that membership in diversified conglomerates typically 
destroys value (Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995)). The findings of underper-
formance or ‘discount’ of diversified firms are consistent with the theoretical argument that 
diversification can be harmful because of multi-layered agency problems between share-
holders and managers (Rajan et al (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000)), which results in 
inefficient allocation of resources across the firm’s divisions through internal capital mar-
kets. 
In sharp contrast, many studies of groups in emerging markets reveal that group 
members do better than unaffiliated firms in terms of economic performance. This body of 
evidence, for instance, includes Chang and Choi (1988) for Korea; Keister (1998) for Chi-
na; Khanna and Palepu (1999, 2000) for Chile and India; and Khanna and Rivkin (1999) 
for a cross-country sample. One important explanation for the superior performance of 
group members is based on the observation that many market and economic institutions do 
not exist or are underdeveloped in emerging economies: capital markets are incomplete 
and may be plagued with information and other problems, labor markets often lack institu-
tions for training skilled labor, etc. Business groups are better able than other firms to cope 
with such inadequacies, because their scale and scope enable groups to replicate internally 
the functions that in mature economies are provided by external intermediary institutions. 
In line with this view, Khanna and Palepu (1999) find evidence on the positive role of in-
ternal capital markets in Chilean groups; Chang and Hong (2000) report that Korean 
groups run value-enhancing internal product and labor markets; Khanna and Yafeh (2005) 
find that business groups in Korea, Taiwan and Thailand serve as a risk sharing mechan-Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




isms for their member firms. As group owners in many countries have close ties with gov-
ernment officials, the positive performance effect of group affiliation may also relate to a 
group’s ability to gain privileged access to economically valuable government favors (eg 
tax breaks, state subsidies and contracts). Convincing empirical evidence in support of the 
‘political connections’ hypothesis is provided by Fisman (2001) in his study of Indonesian 
groups. Another possible factor in the superior performance of group firms is that a group 
may serve as a means of exercising market power. Despite the plausibility of this argu-
ment, rigorous methods to test it are yet to be developed in the literature on groups. There 
is, however, some anecdotal evidence suggesting that business groups in developing coun-
tries are not conduits for cartelization, nor do they facilitate multimarket contacts that 
would enhance collusion (Khanna and Yafeh (2007)). 
Even though group affiliation is potentially value-adding, the benefits of group 
membership may not be sufficient to offset the costs associated with agency issues. Unlike 
widely-held conglomerates in the U.S., groups in many developing countries are characte-
rized by concentrated corporate control, often in hands of family holding companies or 
banks (La Porta et al (1999)). Though concentrated ownership in group firms may control 
managerial entrenchment and thus mitigate the ‘owner-manager’ agency problem, this 
structure can generate strong incentives for controlling shareholders to divert or ‘tunnel’ 
resources in their own favor at the expense of minority shareholders (Johnson et al (2000)). 
Systematic evidence on the expropriation of wealth by controlling owners in group firms is 
presented by Bertrand et al (2002) in their study of Indian pyramidal groups and by Bae et 
al (2002), who studied South Korean groups. 
Whether affiliation with a business group is, overall, economically beneficial or 
costly is an open empirical question. Given that both advantages and disadvantages of 
groups are likely to be especially pronounced in weak institutional environments, Russia 
provides a natural setting for analyzing the role of business groups. Underdeveloped finan-
cial markets, lax law enforcement, and poor protection of property rights are all distinctive 
features of the Russian transition from centrally planned to market economy. Using a 
unique database on membership in Russian business groups, in this paper we analyze the 
relationship between group affiliation and firm performance based on a large panel of 
manufacturing joint-stock companies for the period 1999-2002. We first make static com-
parisons of performance between group members and unaffiliated firms using several 
measures of firm efficiency and profitability. Such a choice of performance indicators BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




enables us to draw inferences on whether tunneling is a significant phenomenon among 
Russian business groups. We then try to account for potential endogeneity of group mem-
bership, an issue virtually unaddressed in the existing empirical studies on business groups, 
by analyzing the effect of acquisitions made by groups during the period under considera-
tion on the performance of targeted firms. Finally, we examine two of the aforementioned 
potential sources of benefits of membership in business groups: mutual insurance (risk-
sharing) among affiliated firms and preferential treatment from the state in a form of subsi-
dies and tolerated tax arrears. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of prior empirical 
studies on Russian business groups and explains how our project differs from them. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data and presents basic statistics on the economic role of groups in 
Russia. Section 4 examines the relationship between group affiliation and performance. 
Evidence on state support and intragroup mutual insurance as potential sources of benefits 
of group membership is provided in Section 5. The last section summarizes empirical re-
sults and presents our conclusions. 
 
 
2  Studies on business groups in Russia 
The development of business groups in Russia began when the transition was in progress. 
The mass voucher privatization, with the declared objective of creating a diverse owner-
ship structure in the economy, actually served as an instrument for consolidation of owner-
ship. Starting in 1993 the process was often accompanied by brash violations of the law. 
The serious fighting over assets seemed to be over by about 1998 when the heads (oli-
garchs) of the largest Russian business groups declared that their main concern was for ef-
fective governance of acquired assets. Their plans, however, were interrupted by the finan-
cial crisis of 1998. The worsening of the liquidity problem, due to ruble devaluation and 
GKO defaults, brought about a reduction of stock ownership in a number of groups led by 
commercial banks. This in turn led to a new wave of ownership changes in the Russian 
economy. Active participation by regional authorities in this redistribution was one of the 
most remarkable features of this period. At the same time, favorable conditions in the in-
ternational oil and other raw material markets, starting in 1999, brought significant cash 
inflows to groups operating in the extraction industries, which helped them to expand into Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




                                                
other sectors, such as agriculture, automobiles, and chemicals. While neither the Russian 
banking system nor the Russian stock market could raise adequate resources to meet the 
increased needs of business groups to finance their new investment projects, groups even-
tually began to seek funding from abroad. Another reason for turning to international fi-
nancial markets was the need of controlling owners of groups to legitimize their wealth, 
and selling equity stakes to reputable foreign investors seemed to be one of the best possi-
ble options to solve the problem. In order to meet the requirements of the international 
markets for borrowers and equity issuers, many large groups have made substantial 
changes since 2000 in their organizational structures and mechanisms of intragroup inte-
raction, including the establishment of focused subdivision companies vested with signifi-
cant autonomy rights within groups, adopting ‘good corporate governance’ practices in 
group members, and selling non-core assets
1. The beginning of the new millennium has 
also seen a decline in groups’ lobbying power (at least at the federal level) as a result of the 
government campaign to limit big business’ political influence, which was an essential part 
of the new president Putin’s agenda to strengthen the presidency vis-à-vis the other institu-
tions and actors in the political system. 
Until recently, evidence on performance-effects of group affiliation in Russia was 
modest. The authors presented either casual comparisons of performance indicators be-
tween group and stand-alone enterprises, or cross-section performance regressions based 
on small samples of firms (eg, Perotti and Gelfer (2001), Volchkova (2001)). The first 
study investigating the structure and performance of business groups in detail was by Gu-
riev and Rachinsky (2005). They identified the 23 largest private domestic owners (oli-
garchs) from a set of controlling owners of 1,297 large manufacturing enterprises in 32 in-
dustrial sectors in 2003. These largest owners controlled 42 percent of the sample em-
ployment and 39 percent of the sample output in 2001, which attested to a very high degree 
of ownership concentration in Russia. The authors estimated the effect of controlling-
owner type on total factor productivity growth in 2002 and found that the oligarchs outper-
formed other private Russian owners by 8 percent. As to TFP levels in 2002, oligarchs 
were still as productive as other private domestic owners. 
 
1 Pappe and Galukhina (2006) even call these changes a ‘fundamental shift from diversified business groups 
to focused companies as a principal subject of the Russian big business’. Its peak phase – years from 2003 to 
2005 – is, however, not covered by our data. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Several studies on business groups in Russia investigated whether group members 
were less financially constrained than stand-alone companies. In other words, these studies 
indirectly tested whether internal capital markets could be source of performance differ-
ences between group and unaffiliated firms. 
In the spirit of Fazzari et al (1987), Perotti and Gelfer (2001) estimated invest-
ment-cash flow sensitivities for group and non-group firms in 1995. They found that in-
vestment is positively related to cash flows for unaffiliated firms and negatively for firms 
from bank-led groups. The interpretation given was that intra-group capital markets redi-
rect finance to firms with better investment opportunities, albeit the possibility that control-
ling owners of groups channel resources into private benefits could not be formally re-
jected either. It is worth noting that the Q model of investment used by the authors was 
problematic in its application to the Russian economy. First, because of the inefficiency of 
the Russian stock market in the early phase of transition, market-to-book ratios might not 
properly reflect firms’ investment opportunities. Second, as the number of listed compa-
nies was very low, the sample (34 group affiliates; 37 independent firms) was not repre-
sentative even for the population of large Russian companies. 
In an attempt to avoid stock market data problems, Volchkova (2001) tested dif-
ferences in cash-flow sensitivities between firms from unregistered groups and indepen-
dent firms in 1996-1997 using the accelerator model of investment instead of the Q model. 
This made it possible to consider a somewhat broader sample: 104 group firms and 135 
stand-alone companies. It was found that investment by group affiliates is more dependent 
on cash-flows than that by stand-alone firms of similar size. The author proposed the fol-
lowing interpretation. In an economy with virtually no sources of external finance, as long 
as the cash flow is smaller than the investment demand, the firm will invest the total 
amount of available internal funds. Since the manager of the independent firm has discre-
tion over the cash flow and can misappropriate some of it, and the manager of a group firm 
is subject to costless control by the group bank, the group firm, given the same investment 
demand, will invest a larger proportion of its cash flow than will the independent firm. The 
paper concluded that, although banks in Russian groups did not alleviate information 
asymmetry problem for group affiliates, they did help to solve the problem of contract en-
forcement in group firms. 
The approach of using cash flow sensitivity of investment as a measure of finan-
cial constraints, used by both Perotti and Gelfer (2001) and Volchkova (2001), has howev-Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




                                                
er been questioned both theoretically and empirically in several studies (eg Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997)). Recently, Almeida et al (2004) proposed a new test of the impact of fi-
nancial constraints on corporate policies derived from a dynamic theoretical model of a 
firm’s liquidity demand. In the model, the effect of financial constraints is captured by the 
firm’s propensity to save cash out of cash flows (the cash-flow sensitivity of cash). Empir-
ically, a constrained firm should have a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash, whereas an 
unconstrained firm’s cash-flow sensitivity of cash should display no systematic patterns. 
To test the hypothesis of easier access to external financing for Russian business 
groups compared to the rest of the economy, Shumilov and Volchkova (2004) applied the 
cash-flow sensitivity of cash empirical methodology to a sample of more than 3,000 Rus-
sian companies and found that in the period 1999-2002 Russian business group members 
had statistically the same positive propensity to save cash out of cash flows as that of their 
independent counterparts. Moreover, cash flows sensitivities of cash did not differ as be-
tween bank-led groups and the rest of the groups. These results suggest that access to ex-
ternal financing is constrained for firms affiliated with groups. The authors argued that 
even if internal capital markets do exist within Russian business groups, their efficiency is 
rather doubtful. Therefore, potential performance differences between group-affiliated and 
other firms could hardly be attributed to capital markets within groups in post-crisis Rus-
sia. 
We conclude this section by explaining the contributions of our study to the exist-
ing literature on business groups in Russia. As regards performance comparisons, our 
project differs from the most relevant paper by Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) in the follow-
ing ways. First, we use a more appropriate definition for the category of firms under inves-
tigation. Whereas Guriev and Rachinsky explored assets controlled by the largest Russian 
owners, we are interested in groups of firms under common administrative or financial 
control. It is clear that these two categories of firms widely overlap but do not coincide. 
For instance, a very large enterprise
2 controlled by an oligarch who has no other significant 
assets clearly should not be classified as a ‘business group affiliate’. The second difference 
is that our analysis is based on a comprehensive sample of industrial joint-stock compa-
nies, while Guriev and Rachinsky limited their attention to a much smaller set of large 
firms in selected industrial sectors. Even though they considered both joint-stock and li-
 
2 Such as the steel-producing giant Novolipetsk Metallurgy Plant owned by Vladimir Lisin. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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mited liability companies, the coverage of our regression sample is wider by 70 percent in 
terms of employment and 20percent in terms of output. Finally, and perhaps the most im-
portantly, our data on membership in business groups have a panel structure. This allows 
us to make not only static comparisons between groups and unaffiliated firms but also to 
explore the dynamic effects of joining business groups. As regards studies on possible rea-
sons behind differences in performance between groups and other firms (Perotti and Gelfer 
(2001), Volchkova (2001), Shumilov and Volchkova (2004)), these focused solely on the 
general issue of efficiency of capital markets within groups. Our paper thus presents the 
first attempt to analyze intragroup risk-sharing and preferential treatment from the state as 
potential sources of benefits of group affiliation. 
 
 
3  Data and preliminary observations 
3.1  Data 
In this study we use annual data on Russian manufacturing joint-stock companies (JSCs) 
from the Disclosure Program administered by the Federal Commission for the Securities 
Market (FCSM). According to the Federal Act on JSCs, security issuers are mandated to 
disclose information on their activities to the FCSM in a form of special reports, which are 
then placed on websites of the Disclosure Program of the FCSM and its authorized infor-
mation agencies (AK&M and Interfax). The submitted annual data, in particular, must con-
tain complete financial statements and detailed information on ownership structure, board 
of directors, management, and number of employees. FCSM reports thus cover a wider 
range of enterprise characteristics than any existing large database of Russian firms. The 
program started in 1998, and in 2003 the format of reports changed to PDF files, making 
automatic data processing effectively impossible. Therefore, our dataset of annual financial 
statements constructed on the basis of collected reports spans the period 1998-2002. Its 
earlier version was used in the study on differences in access to external financing between 
business groups’ affiliates and independent firms (Shumilov and Volchkova (2004)). Spe-
cifically for the purposes of the current research, it has been substantially updated and tho-
roughly cleaned (see Appendix A for description of data cleaning procedures). Where 
possible, we filled gaps in financial and employment data using the Russian Enterprise Re-
gistry, a yearly census of large and medium-size firms, maintained by the Russian statistic-Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




                                                
al agency Rosstat. Our working database thus refined contains 19,144 observations for 
4,688 manufacturing firms. 
The data set on membership in business groups (with exit and entry dates), from 
the start of transition until 2002, was compiled in several steps from a variety of sources. 
Note that there is no universal definition of a ’business group’ in the relevant literature, 
because the distinguishing characteristics of groups can vary substantially across institu-
tional contexts
3. Following Pappe (2000), the term business group means here a collection 
of legally separate firms that satisfies two conditions. 1) Affiliates interact and coordinate 
their businesses on a regular basis. 2) There exists a central group entity (bank / company / 
individual(s)) that makes the key binding decisions for all the affiliates. For greater con-
creteness, we added the condition that a group must include at least two large enterprises or 
one large firm and several medium-size companies. Based on this definition and using in-
formation provided by Yakov Pappe, the leading expert on big businesses in Russia, we 
first identified major business groups and their core members. Then, utilizing data on own-
ership structure from FCSM reports, we added to the group membership lists those compa-
nies whose major shareholders were group affiliates identified in the previous stage. Be-
cause, in a number of cases, major shareholders were nominees or offshore firms, we also 
used information about affiliations of the firms’ managers and members of the boards of 
directors. Finally, we tracked articles mentioning firms’ entries into or exits from business 
groups in Russian journals and newspapers during the period under consideration. We 
ended up with a set of 675 group-affiliated manufacturing firms (at least in one year), 
whose reports were present in the FCSM database. 
Business groups were further divided into three categories by type of ultimate 
controlling ownership: the state, private domestic owners or foreign owners. In the state 
groups category, five groups are controlled by the federal government (Gazprom group, 
RAO UES, Rosneft, Slavneft, and TVEL), and two by regional governments (Bashneftek-
him and Tatneft-Nizhnekamskshina). In principle, each government level in a federation 
can pursue its own political and economic objectives, and thus management styles in firms 
controlled by different government levels may vary. We, however, decided not to split 
state groups into subcategories because of the small number firms from regional groups in 
our database. 
 
3 A review of various approaches to define business groups can be found eg in Cuervo-Cazurra (2006). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Our second category, private domestic groups, roughly corresponds to ‘oligarchic 
groups’ from Guriev and Rachinsky paper (2005), though one should keep in mind the 
considerable differences in definitions and samples. The last class, foreign groups, is com-
prised largely of subsidiaries of big multinational corporations (such as BAT, Nestle, Proc-
ter & Gamble). The main results of our group identification procedures are summarized in 
Appendix B, where Table B.1 lists 33 major Russian business groups that were in exis-
tence in 2002, with information on their structure: names of subgroups, major industries 
and biggest manufacturing JSCs, types of controlling owners and names of leading banks. 
 
 
3.2  Variables 
We now turn to definitions of variables required in the analysis of relationship between 
group affiliation and firm performance. 
Performance measures. Empirical measurement of performance in Russia, as in 
any other transition economy, is subject to transition-specific difficulties. For instance, be-
cause during 1998-2002 the Russian stock market was very narrow (with less than 100 
publicly listed firms) and highly inefficient, we can hardly rely on equity-based indicators 
of performance. As there is no consensus on the best single performance measure (see eg 
Bevan et al (1999) for a discussion of merits and drawbacks of different measures in the 
transition context), we use several common indicators that can be constructed from ac-
counting data: two measures of efficiency - total factor productivity (TFP) and labor prod-
uctivity - and two measures of profitability - return on assets (ROA) and return on sales 
(ROS). 
TFP for firm i is calculated as a residual from estimation of a log-linear Cobb–
Douglas production function for the three-digit industry j in year t: 
 
γ α + β +ε + = ) log( ) log( ) log(
ijt Y ijt K ijt L
, 
 
where   is net sales,   is average fixed assets for the year, and   is the yearly average 
number of employees. To make data comparable across years, we deflate sales and capital 
(as well as other relevant nominal variables) using annual producer price indices published 
by Rosstat for four-digit industries. Theoretically, TFP is the best measure of enterprise Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




                                                
efficiency, but in transition economies it often suffers from the problem of inaccurate mea-
surement of capital stock (revaluations of fixed assets, imperfect deflators). Therefore, for 
comparative purposes, we also consider labor productivity as an alternative efficiency 
measure. We define it as ratio of sales net of VAT and excises to the yearly average num-
ber of employees. ROA is calculated as operating profit divided by average total assets for 
the year, and return on sales is the ratio of operating profit to net sales. 
Group affiliation and ownership categories. These will be the main explanatory 
variables in our study. To distinguish between group members and other companies (also 
hereafter called stand-alones or independent firms), we introduce the dummy GROUP, 
which is equal to 1 if a firm is affiliated with some business group in a particular year and 
zero otherwise. Dummies STATE GROUP, FOREIGN GROUP and PRIVATE GROUP, 
defined similarly, represent affiliation with groups controlled by the state, foreign and pri-
vate domestic owners, respectively. Since it is natural to compare performance of group 
and non-group firms of the same ownership category, we also introduce three indicator va-
riables, STATE, FOREIGN and PRIVATE, for different categories of unaffiliated firms, as 
follows. A non-group firm is classified as state (foreign)-owned, if the state (foreign inves-
tor
4) is the largest shareholder with holdings exceeding the blocking threshold of 25 per-
cent of voting shares. The rest of the stand-alones are referred to as domestically-owned 
firms. 
Control variables. In order to isolate and measure the performance-effect of 
group affiliation, it is necessary to control for other factors that could impact firm perfor-
mance. An important parameter here is firm size, as large firms may benefit from econo-
mies of scale and may have better access to financial resources. Moreover, large firms are 
much more efficient than smaller ones in lobbying their interests in the government (eg to 
receive state contracts). Therefore, size is likely to be positively correlated with perfor-
mance. In the regressions, we proxy firm size by the natural logarithm of average employ-
ment for the initial year in the sample. 
Performance may also depend on the firm’s stage of the life-cycle. Industrial or-
ganization theory suggests that mature firms are more experienced, enjoy the benefits of 
 
4 It is well-known that many of the shareholders residing abroad, especially in offshore zones like Cyprus or 
Gibraltar, are actually controlled by Russian owners. To avoid mismeasurement of our foreign ownership 
category, we carefully checked the national affiliations of foreign shareholders’ owners, using information 
from the Russian business press. Firms whose owners were revealed to be domestic were not treated as for-
eign investors. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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learning, and have a first-mover advantage over firms in the early stage. They may thus 
enjoy superior performance. At the same time, there could be an offsetting effect: young 
firms may be more open to new technology as well as more flexible in terms of style and 
effectiveness of managerial governance. In contrast, firms in the declining stage are usually 
characterized by inferior performance compared to other firms. We will account for differ-
ences in life-cycle stage by introducing two dummies: the first for firms registered in 1998 
or later and the second for firms that stopped submitting reports to the FCSM between 
1999 and 2002
5. 
Next, performance can be expected to vary systematically across industries be-
cause of differences in degree of competition, technology, etc. Such factors are captured by 
27 industry dummy variables based on the three-digit level of Russian industry classifica-
tion OKONKh. Lastly, to control for province specifics (eg wage and price levels), we util-
ize dummies for the seven federal districts and Moscow City (as a reference group). 
 
 
3.3  Sample selection and summary statistics 
After constructing the variables for our analysis, the following selection criteria were ap-
plied to the original database. First, we eliminated observations with missing values in any 
financial variable in use and zero-observations for sales or total and fixed assets for the 
start and end of year. Second, since it is methodologically incorrect to compare very small 
firms with affiliates of business groups, we excluded observations for firms with less than 
100 employees in every year. Another reason for introducing a lower border for employ-
ment was to exclude the trading and coordinating companies, which usually have high 
sales revenue and few employees and only nominally belong to the manufacturing sector. 
Finally, we dropped firm-years reflecting extremely large jumps in business fundamentals 
(sales, employment and total assets), typically indicative of drastic reorganizations, mer-
gers or accounting data manipulations. The resulting sample thus restricted contains 15,629 
firm-year observations on 3,715 enterprises for the period 1998-2002. The firms in this fi-
nal sample account respectively for some 40 percent and 53 percent of total employment 
 
5 Inspection of the Russian Enterprise Registry has shown that in the years after secession of disclosure re-
porting these firms were either absent from the RERLD, or had extremely low levels of output and employ-
ment. Therefore, we believe that most non-reporters were indeed liquidated or ended their manufacturing 
activities. Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




and total output in the Russian manufacturing sector. Representativeness checks are per-
formed in Appendix C. Our overall conclusion is that the sample fairly represents the un-
iverse of large and medium size manufacturing firms in terms of sectors and regions. 
Before examining firm characteristics, we provide information on the economic 
importance of business groups in Russia. About 520 firms in the sample were affiliated 
with groups (in at least one year) during 1998-2002. Contributions of group companies to 
sample output and employment are shown in Figure 1. The statistics confirm the conven-
tional view that business groups control a large part of the Russian economy: their share 
was 50 percent of sample sales and 31 percent of sample employment in 1998, and these 
grew steadily to 60 and 44 percent in 2002. Among the different categories of groups, pri-
vate domestic conglomerates account for the biggest share of output and employment (36 
and 27 percent, respectively, in 2002), while foreign groups control the smallest shares (3 
and 1 percent). Figure 2 presents the shares of group firms in the sample output of different 
industries in the last year of the sample. One sees that business groups have a strong pres-
ence in the largest industrial sectors, especially in energy and natural resources. Private 
groups dominate the fuel industry (65 percent of total sales), non-ferrous metallurgy (60 
percent), and account for nearly one-half of total sales in ferrous metallurgy. In domestic-
oriented sectors, the dominating role of private groups is especially pronounced in the au-
tomotive industry, the largest subsector of machinery and metal working (74 percent of 
total sales). Turning to state groups’ shares, subsidiaries of the state monopoly Unified 
Energy Systems almost entirely control the electricity sector. Other state groups have sig-
nificant presence in the fuel and chemical industries (25 and 19 percent of total sales re-
spectively). The last group category, foreigners, accounts for a considerable share of output 
(28 percent) in just one sector, food processing. The very modest presence of foreign 
groups in Russian industry compared to other group categories should, however, come as 
no surprise. As argued in the literature on FDI in Russia (eg Yudaeva et al (2003)), it 
seems to be a result of both legal and informal restrictions set by the authorities on acquir-
ing and establishing new firms by foreigners in many industrial sectors (eg oil, gas, and 
strategic materials). 
Univariate comparisons of firm attributes are a natural starting point in our analy-
sis of performance differences between group affiliates and stand-alone enterprises. Table 
3 presents descriptive statistics on size and performance measures for the whole sample 
period, 1998-2002. As seen from columns 2 and 3, group affiliates are on average several BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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times larger than non-group firms, irrespective of whether size is measured by sales, em-
ployment or fixed or total assets. In terms of performance statistics, group firms have sub-
stantially higher average labor productivity (0.94 vs 0.35) and higher return on sales (0.1 
vs 0.05), whereas ROA (0.06) and sales growth (0.14) are statistically the same for inde-
pendent and group companies. 
Looking at the breakdown of groups by ownership type, we can see that different 
business groups are not identical in their characteristics. Firms affiliated with groups con-
trolled by the state are the largest in terms of all measures of size. Compared to the refer-
ence sample of independent state firms, they have higher average labor productivity and 
return on sales, but significantly lower return on assets and sales growth. The latter result 
should not be surprising, given that we observe huge size discrepancies between state-
controlled groups and stand-alones. Members of domestic private groups are much more 
heterogeneous in size than affiliates with state groups (as indicated by wide differences in 
means and medians of size indicators), although the average size figures do not differ dra-
matically across these two categories. Comparison of private groups and private stand-
alones reveals the same pattern in performance differences as for the case in which we did 
not distinguish between group categories: significantly higher labor productivity and ROS 
in group firms and the same for average ROA and sales growth. Finally, affiliates of 
groups owned by foreigners are bigger than focused foreign stand-alones in terms of sales 
and assets, despite their being the smallest of the group firms. Average performance of for-
eign groups’ members is striking: all performance indicators are at least 1.5 times higher 
than those of the category of foreign independent firms. These differences are particularly 
notable if we take into account that foreign stand-alones are the most successful category 
of independent firms, by all performance measures. 
The same picture unfolds if we compare different group categories with stand-
alones taken as a whole or look at year-by-year summary statistics (not reported to save 
space). In sum, raw data comparisons suggest systematic differences in performance be-
tween independent and group firms. The obvious problem with univariate approach, how-
ever, is that group membership may be correlated with variables that have their own direct 
effects on performance. As we already saw, group firms differ greatly from stand-alones in 
one of these parameters, firm size. Moreover, independent and group firms are very un-
evenly distributed across industries. Therefore, descriptive statistics results are likely to be 
misleading, so that we resort to multivariate analysis. Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




it it it it Controls variables   ownership   and   Group e Performanc
4  Regression analysis 
4.1  Econometric model 
To investigate the relationship between firm performance and group membership, we esti-
mate performance equations of the following form: 
 
ε γ β α + + + = ) ( ) ( ) (,
                                                
        (1) 
 
where (Performance) is one of the selected performance measures, (Group and ownership 
variables) is either the GROUP dummy or a set of dummies for different ownership cate-
gories of group and independent firms
6. Control variables include firm size, dummies for 
new and dying firms, industry and regional dummies (with ‘other manufacturing’ and 
Moscow City as references, respectively). 
As group affiliation variables do not vary much over time, we focus on the longer-
term relationship between group affiliation and performance and hence estimate the model 
using the between-effects method (ie least squares regression of individual averages over 
the period 1999-2002). Apart from comparing performance levels in the basic specifica-
tion, it is also interesting to look at changes in performance, and so we also consider a 
model specification in which the value of dependent variable for the initial year in the 
sample is included as one of covariates. 
To mitigate possible undue influence of outliers in subsequent regressions, we 
winsorize all dependent variables at 1percent and 99percent levels of their distributions. 
We also control for the fact that our panel is unbalanced (and thus individual averages are 
calculated on the basis of time series of different lengths) by year-demeaning all conti-
nuous variables in the model. For the same reason, estimation is performed via WLS, 
where the weighting is based on the number of observations per firm. Additionally, stan-




6 Since six categories of groups and unaffiliated firms are mutually exclusive, we omit dummy variable for 
the biggest subsample of firms, private stand-alones. Choosing another category of independent firms as a 
benchmark does not affect the significance of the main results. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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4.2  Estimation results 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the performance regressions for the case in which catego-
ries of business groups are not distinguished. Before getting to the results related to our 
main interest, we examine how some conventional firm-specific factors affect our depen-
dent variables. In line with standard theoretical predictions, firm size is significantly posi-
tively related to both efficiency and profitability (though for ROA the relationship is 
somewhat weaker than for other performance measures). Firm life-cycle controls also ex-
hibit the expected relationships with performance. Consistent with the supposition of poor 
performance in the declining stage, the dummy for firms that stopped reporting is negative 
and highly significant in all regressions. New firms do not differ significantly from others 
in terms of efficiency measures, which suggests that the two counteracting effects of open-
ness to new technology and lack of experience at the early stage of the life-cycle offset 
each other. At the same time, younger firms are shown to have lower profitability, which 
reflects the initial sunk-costs burden of these firms. 
We now look at how the key variable, the GROUP dummy, is related to perfor-
mance outcomes. In the basic specification for total factor productivity, the coefficient of 
this dummy is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that group affili-
ates are more productive than stand-alone firms. Specifically, a group member outperforms 
an independent firm, on average, by 14 percent in TFP. When the initial level of TFP is 
included in a set of controls (specification 2), the coefficient of the group dummy is again 
positive and highly significant. Hence, group firms have an advantage over stand-alones, 
not only in level of TFP but also in the cumulative growth of this indicator (the estimated 
growth difference is 6 percent). 
Regressions for another efficiency indicator, labor productivity, yield qualitatively 
similar results: group affiliates perform significantly better than stand-alones. Quantitative-
ly, performance differences between these two subsamples of firms are now more pro-
nounced: 54 percent in terms of labor productivity levels and 18 percent in terms of its 
growth. But, in conjunction with findings from the TFP regressions, this indicates that 
group firms are substantially less capital productive than stand-alones, which is a strange 
result. It follows that our capital variable, even after adjustment for inflation, is still likely 
to be an imperfect proxy for the true value of capital. Hence our decision to introduce labor Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




productivity as an alternative efficiency measure in the study appears to be warranted, and 
we recommend treating quantitative estimates of TFP regressions with some caution. 
The last four columns in the table display the regressions for profitability meas-
ures, return on sales and return on assets. As is known from the basics of firm theory, effi-
ciency improvement results in reduced unit costs of production and, ceteris paribus, in-
creased profits. Therefore, as group members have proven to be much more efficient than 
stand-alones, we would expect significantly higher profitability among group firms. Sur-
prisingly, the regression results show that this is not the case. In the basic specification for 
the return on sales, the difference between group affiliates and stand-alones is economical-
ly small (1 percentage point for a sample standard deviation of 13 points) and statistically 
insignificant. In terms of ROA, group firms again do as well as the focused independent 
firms, neither better nor worse. The same conclusion can be drawn by examining specifica-
tions of performance equations, which capture the effects of changes in profitability. 
How can one explain the apparent puzzle of divergence between efficiency and 
profitability in group firms? One possibility is that group firms operate in a more competi-
tive environment, so that their efficiency advantage over independent firms does not result 
in higher profitability. Note, however, that in our performance regressions, we already im-
plicitly controlled for the competition effect by utilizing a set of dummies for 3-digit indus-
tries and federal districts. To test further, we introduced a 4-firm concentration ratio at the 
4-digit industry level and firm share in the regional (oblast) output as explicit measures of 
market competition. We found that, contrary to the stated hypothesis, group firms tend to 
operate in less competitive industries during the observed period: the average concentra-
tion ratio for these firms is 20 percent, compared to 14 percent for stand-alones. We then 
replicated all the performance models with our competition measures included in the set of 
covariates. This yielded results absolutely identical to those in Table 2, suggesting that 
market competition issues are hardly related to the puzzle resolution. 
In fact, the result that efficiency gains of group firms do not adequately material-
ize in profitability is fully consistent with the anecdotal evidence on ultimate owners si-
phoning profits from manufacturing units of Russian business groups to extract private 
benefits of control and to evade taxes (see eg Black et al (2000), Fortescue (2006), Desai et 
al (2007)). The most common technique of profit dissipation during the period under con-
sideration was transfer-pricing in various guises (overstating costs and/or understating rev-
enues), typically implemented as follows. The manufacturing firm sells its output at an un-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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realistically low price to the trading firm, which is registered in an offshore or onshore tax 
haven and controlled by the largest shareholders of the first firm. The second firm then 
sells output products at market prices. The result is that the markup accrues to the trading 
firm, while the manufacturer loses money and the state and minority shareholders are ex-
propriated
7. A World Bank (2004) study presented strong evidence that transfer-pricing is 
especially widespread in the export oriented natural resource sectors - oil, gas and metals - 
where differences between domestic and export prices of main commodities still exist. To 
determine whether the behavior of groups in these sectors differs from that in the rest of 
the industry, in unreported regressions for all performance measures, we excluded oil, gas 
and metals firms from the sample. In this case, the divergence between efficiency and prof-
itability in group firms virtually disappears. As before, group firms are substantially more 
efficient than stand-alones, but now they have significantly higher returns on sales. The 
coefficient of return on assets changes to positive and is only marginally insignificant. 
These results thus suggest that group owners are most actively engaged in tunneling profits 
out of controlled firms in the in natural resource sectors of the economy. 
Results of regressions with a single dummy for all business groups, though ro-
bust
8 and compelling, may conceal some heterogeneity among both group affiliates and 
stand-alones. Table 3 reports performance regressions where different ownership catego-
ries of groups and unaffiliated firms are introduced. As in the previous case, we first ex-
amine specifications for efficiency measures of performance. Column 1 shows that, in 
terms of TFP levels, private groups outperform private stand-alones by 12 percent, and 
state groups do better than state-owned unaffiliated firms by 22 percent. The efficiency dif-
ference between foreign groups and foreign stand-alones is also unsurprisingly positive (6 
percent
9), but insignificant (as indicated by the F-test reported at the bottom of the Table). 
When initial level of TFP is controlled for (Column 2), differences in cumulative TFP 
growth between group members and stand-alones within all three ownership categories are 
positive, but the one within the category of foreign-owned firms again lacks significance. 
One caveat to these findings is that our capital variable is still likely to suffer from mea-
 
7 To a limited extent, transfer-pricing can be separated from the desire to expropriate minority shareholders 
or to minimize taxation. For instance, a trading firm may be a direct subsidiary of a manufacturing firm, act 
as a profit center and bear the full tax burden. Although in the Russian context such a possibility seems re-
mote, we cannot reject it formally, because trading firms are not represented in our dataset. 
8 They withstand a number of robustness checks: dropping outliers instead of winsorizing data, excluding 
firms that stopped reporting and new firms, using alternative sets of industry dummies (two- or four-digit 
classifications). Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




                                                                                                                                                   
surement problems, as we noted above. This may lead to hardly predictable biases in esti-
mates of TFP regressions. We therefore suggest viewing outcomes of TFP specifications as 
only supplementary in drawing inferences about the effects of affiliation with different 
groups on firm efficiency. It appears to be more appropriate to rely on regression results 
for a less distorted efficiency measure, labor productivity. Column 3, with the correspond-
ing baseline specification, shows that, similar to the TFP case, productivity differences be-
tween groups and stand-alones of the same ownership type are positive, but now they are 
all strongly significant. The magnitude of group effects is large: labor productivity for 
members of private, state and foreign groups is 30, 25 and 93 percent
10 higher than for 
stand-alones of corresponding ownership categories. Over-performance of group firms re-
mains in the specification for cumulative growth of labor productivity (Column 4), except 
that the estimated growth difference between groups and stand-alones owned by the state is 
quite small and insignificant. This result suggests that there could be a positive selection in 
the process of forming state groups. Thus the productivity advantage of state groups over 
state unaffiliated firms observed in the baseline specification is likely to be somewhat 
overstated. We will return to the selection issues with respect to group membership in the 
next subsection. 
So far we have analyzed how group affiliation is related to efficiency within own-
ership categories. Interesting observations can also be made on how a firm’s performance 
differs between ownership subsamples. Comparison of the results for different ownership 
types (both across groups and stand-alones) in the baseline efficiency specifications shows 
that foreign firms substantially outperform private ones, which in turn are more productive 
than state-owned firms. These findings confirm those of the earlier (often cross-sectional) 
empirical studies documenting a positive role for private and especially foreign ownership 
in enhancing enterprise performance in Russia (eg Earle and Estrin (1997), Muraviev 
(2002), Yudaeva et al (2003)) due to better incentives to monitor managers (Vickers and 
Yarrow (1990)) and reduced political interference (Boycko et al (1996)). Several recent 
studies employing adequate techniques to control for endogeneity of ownership (Brown et 
al (2004), Sabirianova et al (2005)), however, found that better performing assets were 
transferred from state to private hands in the first place, implying that research based on 
cross-section data or methodology overstates the benefits of privatization. After accounting 
 
9 exp(0.111)-1=0.12; exp(0.022+0.175)-1=0.22; exp(0.524-0.464)-1=0.06. 
10 exp(0.26)-1=0.3; exp(0.122+0.105)-1=0.25; exp(1.454-0.794)=0.93. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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for this selection bias, the effect of domestic private ownership on productive efficiency 
turned out to be negligible, though increasing slowly over time, whereas the foreign-
domestic efficiency differential remained large. The latter finding is supported in our addi-
tional efficiency specifications: examination of Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 reveals that 
foreign ownership is characterized by superior efficiency growth throughout 1999-2002 
compared to all other types of owners, while the effect of domestic private ownership is 
statistically indistinguishable from that of state ownership. 
Let us now explore whether groups’ efficiency advantage observed within all 
ownership categories translates into higher profitability. As seen from Columns 5 and 7, 
this is the case only for foreign groups, which have 9(5) percentage points higher return on 
sales (return on assets) than foreign stand alones. In contrast, the profitability difference 
between state groups and state independent firms is small (1 p-pt each for ROS and ROA) 
and insignificant, while private groups, strikingly, are even less profitable (by 2 p-pts for 
ROS and by 3 p-pts. for ROA) than private unaffiliated firms
11. Given that we also find 
that ordering of ownership categories of independent firms by profitability coincides with 
that by efficiency (foreign firms are both more efficient and profitable than private ones, 
which are better performers than state stand-alones), these results suggest that owners 
and/or managers of private groups tunnel substantial amounts of profits out of group mem-
bers to extract private benefits of control, affiliates with state groups are also engaged in 
tunneling, but likely to a smaller degree, whereas profit dissipation in foreign groups seems 
to be insignificant. 
Our results on the ‘efficiency-profitability’ relationship in different categories of 
firms are robust to the exclusion of oil, gas and metals firms from the sample. Thus tunne-
ling in members of private and state groups should not be attributed solely to the group-
specific behavior in industries where it is relatively easy to use profit dissipation tech-
niques. What then are the reasons behind the differences in the extent of tunneling between 
owners of our three groups categories? An important rationale for large-scale profit dissi-
pation in private groups is as follows. When building their wealth, most owners of private 
groups (unlike those of other group categories) stripped assets from state-controlled firms 
and bought industrial assets in questionable privatization auctions at the lowest possible 
prices, which immediately posed a problem of illegitimacy of their property rights. To 
 
11 Similar group effects are observed in specifications for changes in profitability (Columns 6 and 8). Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




                                                
hedge against the risk of possible future expropriation of property by the Russian govern-
ment, owners of private groups have strong incentives to tunnel funds to safe banking de-
posits abroad (Braguinsky and Myerson (2007)). Next, a plausible explanation for the exis-
tence of tunneling in state groups is that the state does not have a close control over them; 
and thus their managers are able to appropriate some part of control and cash flow rights 
for their private benefits. In addition, owners/managers of domestic business groups (both 
state and private) have superior connections with government officials, which allow them 
to escape punishment for tax evasion and the abuse of minority shareholders associated 
with large-scale profit dissipation. Finally, our results on extraction of private benefits in 
different groups may be partially explained by the differences in degree of ownership con-
centration: a quick inspection of ownership data shows that foreign groups have nearly 100 
percent of votes in most of their members (hence the pie of minority shareholders is small 
and their expropriation is not an important issue for controlling owners), while equity 
stakes of private groups are sometimes at levels (eg 51percent) such that large shareholders 
have strong incentives to expropriate minority owners. These data on group shareholdings, 
however, still require some adjustment
12, and we leave it as an interesting future project to 
analyze the effect of group ownership on performance. 
The presence of the category of foreign groups, where tunneling is likely to be 
negligible, allows us to go one important step further than in the case of groups as a whole 
and obtain rough but informative quantitative estimates of the extent of profit dissipation in 
private and state groups. Our logic rests on the assumption that, in the absence of tunne-
ling, efficiency gain within the same ownership category should materialize in a profita-
bility advantage in the proportion of 93 percent higher labor productivity to 6 percentage 
points higher return on sales (exactly as in the case of foreign groups vs foreign stand-
alones). Then, had owners of private and state groups not engaged in tunneling, the esti-
mated efficiency differences between groups and stand-alones within these two ownership 
categories would translate into 2.7 (2.5) percentage points higher ROS for members of pri-
vate(state) groups relative to private(state) unaffiliated firms. Taking into account regres-
sion estimates of differences in ROS between groups and stand-alones within correspond-
ing ownership categories, we find that tunneling results in a deterioration of ROS of 4.5 
 
12 One example where correction is needed is related to the fact that Russian antitrust law subjects a purchase of blocks 
of 20 percent or higher to be disclosed and approved by antitrust authorities. To avoid this, many new controlling owners 
prefer to obtain several small stakes (often through different nominees) instead of one large stake. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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percentage points for private groups and 1.3 percentage points for state groups. Given that 
the mean value of observed ROS in private groups is 0.08 and the standard deviation is 
0.18, the scale of tunneling in private groups turns out to be economically large, while in 
state groups, as expected, it is rather small (as the mean ROS is 0.11 and standard devia-
tion is 0.15). Analogous calculations for another profitability measure, ROA, yield very 
similar estimates of profitability deterioration due to tunneling: 4 percentage points for 
members of private groups and 0.5 percentage points for firms from state groups. 
 
 
4.3  Endogeneity of group membership 
One might be tempted to interpret the results of static comparisons between groups and 
other firms in a causal way, namely, that membership in business groups of all types leads 
to higher efficiency. This interpretation is, however, subject to the caveat of potential en-
dogeneity of group membership. For example, it might be the case that some unobserved 
factors cause both performance and group affiliation. Reverse causality explanation of the 
positive correlation between group affiliation and performance cannot be ruled out either, 
since it is possible that business groups being good investors acquire better performing 
firms. Unfortunately, accounting for size, industry and regional specifics in OLS regres-
sions does not fully address these concerns. 
Correcting for endogeneity of group affiliation is an example of the general statis-
tical problem of estimating average treatment effects in observational studies where as-
signment of individuals to treatment and control groups (in our case, group members and 
stand-alone firms, respectively) is not random. Because of its great practical importance in 
microeconomic applications, estimation of treatment effects has received much attention in 
the recent econometric modeling literature, which generated a range of relevant estimation 
methods (see eg Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) and Wooldridge (2002) for reviews). Dif-
ferent estimators require different (and largely untestable) assumptions for consistency and 
no one generally dominates the others. Therefore, since the specifics of potential endo-
geneity of group affiliation are a priori not clear, it is reasonable here to experiment with 
several methods. 
One popular technique for estimating treatment effects (especially in cross-section 
data cases) is the instrumental variables (IV) approach. It can be very effective if good in-Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




struments for treatment are available. These variables should be exogenous in the outcome 
(performance) equation, correlated with the participation decision, but should not directly 
affect the potential outcomes from treatment. Unfortunately, we are not able to identify va-
lid instruments in the current study due to data limitations and lack of the theoretical guid-
ance on which parameters might be candidates for instruments – the theory of business 
groups’ formation and dynamic evolution is virtually nonexistent. In fact, such problems 
with finding appropriate instruments are omnipresent in the empirical literature on business 
groups. As Khanna and Yafeh (2007) note, no study to date has managed to portray the 
endogenous formation of business groups using the IV approach. 
The availability of longitudinal data enables a researcher to estimate treatment ef-
fects without instrumental variables. Specifically, if the treatment impact is assumed to be 
constant across individuals and over time, and if selection of treatment is independent of 
temporary individual-specific effects, then consistent estimates can be obtained by estimat-
ing equation (1) by the fixed effects method. Note that fixed effects coefficients are only 
identified from within-firm changes in group affiliation status. Since we have a substantial 
amount of firms with such changes (138 firms joined and 6 firms exited groups in 1999-
2002), use of the fixed effects approach is feasible here. 
Panel A of Table 4 gives the results of fixed effects estimations of equation (1) for 
different performance indicators (labor productivity, ROS and ROA) without distinguish-
ing between group categories. In all regressions, the coefficients of the GROUP dummy 
are negative, but statistically insignificant, suggesting that joining a business group does 
not significantly change a firm’s performance. One could however hypothesize that per-
formance would improve after a period of restructuring, rather than immediately upon join-
ing a group. To test this hypothesis, we modified our group affiliation dummy so that it is 
equal to zero in years of group entry. After this transformation, we had 133 ‘new’ group 
members. Fixed effects analysis (Panel B of the same Table) shows that in the regression 
for labor productivity the coefficient of the group dummy changes sign to positive, while 
in profitability regressions it remains negative, but somewhat closer to zero than in regres-
sions for the untransformed group variable. Though we observe some positive trend in the 
coefficients of interest, all the results again lack significance. Thus, even when considering 
group entries with a one year lag, we do not find strong evidence that joining a business 
group is associated with changes in performance. As an additional robustness check, we 
considered only those firms that changed their group affiliation status during 2000-2002, BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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and thus reduced our regression sample period to 1999-2002. Results of FE regressions for 
both transformed and untransformed group dummies remained unchanged. 
The very small number of acquisitions by foreign and state groups in the panel (22 
and 10, respectively) precludes us from performing FE estimation of equation (1) with a 
full set of dummies for the different group categories. Instead, we will examine only the 
effect of acquisitions by private domestic groups (there are 120 such transitions). Results 
of FE regressions when the dummy for private groups is taken as a group affiliation varia-
ble are shown on Panel C of Table 4. As in the case of all group firms considered together, 
joining private groups has no statistically significant impact on firm productivity. At the 
same time, in profitability regressions, coefficients of the dummy for private groups are 
negative and highly significant. Like the results of static comparisons in the previous sub-
section, these findings of unchanged productivity and worsened profitability are again con-
sistent with the profit dissipation story: soon after acquiring a firm, the owners of a private 
group engage new affiliates in profit hiding practice. Our results are confirmed when we 
modify the dummy for private groups or reduce the sample period as described above. Cor-
responding regressions are not reported, to save space. 
As we already mentioned, no one of the treatment effects estimators dominates 
the others, and the FE approach, in turn, has its own limitations. First, it cannot address 
event-related selection for business groups. Another potential problem with this method is 
that fixed effects models often have limited statistical power when variables of interest 
vary slowly over time. 
An alternative method that we use here is the matching approach. One of its main 
advantages over regression-based estimators is that, being a non-parametric method, 
matching does not require specifying the functional form of the performance equation and 
so is not susceptible to bias due to misspecification along that dimension. The aim of 
matching is to construct the correct sample counterpart for the missing information on the 
treated outcomes had they not been treated by pairing participants (in the present context, 
firms that joined business groups during the observed period) with members of non-treated 
group (firms that remained independent for the whole period). The crucial assumption here 
is that there exists a set of observed pre-treatment characteristics X such that conditional on 
X potential outcomes (in our case, performance) are independent of the treatment. This 
implies that selection for treatment is based solely on observable characteristics. Clearly, Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




this is a strong assumption, and to obtain meaningful results using the matching technique, 
one needs a rich set of conditioning variables at hand. 
When there are several characteristics X in which the treatment and control 
groups differ, the task of constructing a matched sample becomes virtually impossible (the 
‘curse of dimensionality’). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed a solution to this prob-
lem: use ‘balancing scores’, functions of observed characteristics X such that the condi-
tional distribution of X, given the balancing score, is independent of the treatment. One 
possible balancing score is the ‘propensity score’, defined as the probability of assignment 
to treatment conditional on observed pre-treatment characteristics X. 
The matching procedure based on propensity score is performed in two steps. 
First, the propensity score is estimated using a binary discrete choice model, such as a pro-
bit. Then the individuals are matched on the basis of their predicted probabilities of receiv-
ing treatment, obtained from the first stage. We utilize the popular nearest-neighbor match-
ing estimator, where each treated firm is matched with the non-treated firm with the closest 
propensity score. The average treatment effect on the treated is then estimated as the dif-
ference between the mean performance of the treated firms and the (weighted) mean per-
formance of firms included in the counterfactual group. 
We start by estimating the propensity score using probit. The choice of what va-
riables to include in the probit model is not straightforward. Recall that most Russian busi-
ness groups are based on strong ownership ties with just a few ultimate owners (Pappe 
(2000)). And these are generally group authorities who decide whether to acquire a firm, 
and stand-alone firms cannot join business groups at their own discretion. Therefore, we 
choose the set of observable pre-acquisition characteristics similar to those used in empiri-
cal studies analyzing the relationship between ownership changes and performance with 
the help of the propensity score matching technique (eg Arnold and Javorcik (2005), Girma 
and Gorg (2007)): size (capital), labor productivity, profitability (ROS) and debt-to-assets 
ratio. All these variables are lagged one period. Furthermore, we include a time trend and 
industry and regional dummies to account for the differences in attractiveness of industries 
and regions to business groups. 
Column 2 of Table 5 reports probit estimates for the case of acquisitions by 
groups as a whole. The results show that groups tend to acquire firms systematically dif-
ferent from others. As indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of the capital 
variable, larger firms are more attractive to business groups. Positive coefficients for prof-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
itability and labor productivity
13 suggest that groups ‘cherry pick’ better performing estab-
lishments. The last financial variable, debt-to-assets ratio, also turns out to be significantly 
positively related to the probability of being acquired by a business group. One possible 
interpretation is that a high debt-to-assets ratio could itself be viewed as an indicator of en-
terprise success, because Russian firms have on average limited ability to issue debt or ob-
tain bank loans. An alternative explanation is that heavily indebted firms are the easiest 
targets for takeovers. 
The post-probit estimation balancing test indicates that the balancing property of 
the propensity score is satisfied. Now we can use nearest-neighbor matching to estimate 
the average treatment effects on the treated for our performance indicators. Corresponding 
results are reported in Table 6, Panel A. Note that the number of treated firms (94) is high-
er than the number of untreated matched firms (89), because nearest-neighbor matching is 
performed with replacement (ie one stand-alone firm could be used as a counterfactual for 
two or more firms acquired by groups). As the table shows, the estimated impact of joining 
groups on firm productivity is insignificant both in acquisition year and one year after join-
ing a group. This result coincides with our finding on the relationship between joining 
groups and productivity based on the FE method. Signs of the effects of group acquisitions 
on profitability measures are negative, which is again consistent with FE results. Under the 
matching approach, however, these effects become marginally significant one year after 
joining a group. This gives some support to the hypothesis that groups (viewed as a whole) 
deploy transfer pricing or similar techniques to siphon off profits soon after acquiring new 
members. 
Analysis of acquisitions by private groups using propensity score matching (Col-
umn 3 of Table 5 and Panel B of Table 6) yields results overall similar to those in the case 
of acquisitions by groups as a whole: successful firms are picked up; the treatment does not 
significantly impact productivity and negatively affects profitability. The only difference is 
that now size and statistical significance of the negative effect of group acquisitions on 
both profitability measures one year after joining a group are now more pronounced: a 5 
percent drop in ROS and 6 percent fall in ROA, as compared to corresponding figures of 3 
and 2 percent in the previous case. It follows that, among different owners of business 
 
13 Labor productivity lacks significance, which is most likely due to relatively high correlation with other 
regressors. We also tried an alternative specification of the probit model excluding return on sales. Then la-Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




                                                                                                                                                   
groups, private owners deploy profit dissipation schemes in acquired firms most aggres-
sively. 
In sum, the results of our exercises with two different techniques to account for 
endogeneity of group affiliation (as a whole and affiliation with private groups) are largely 
consistent with each other. Given that our panel is relatively short and many firms joined 
groups before the starting year, we should be cautious in drawing inferences about causal 
effects of membership in business groups. With respect to productivity, we find no statis-
tical evidence on its immediate improvement in firms after joining groups. It is however 
possible that a substantial amount of time is needed to reveal the benefits of group affilia-
tion, and our sample time span could be too short to observe such productivity improve-
ments. Therefore, whether static estimates of the productivity-effect of group affiliation are 
significantly biased upward or not remains an open question. The picture is somewhat 
clearer for the relationship between group affiliation and profitability. We find that groups 
tend to acquire more profitable firms and that the short-term dynamic effect of group affili-
ation on profitability is negative. Again, we are reluctant to claim that this necessarily im-
plies a negative causal effect of group affiliation on profitability, as hard evidence can be 
obtained only by considering all transitions into groups. Nevertheless, the plausibility of 
this hypothesis is supported by the result from our static regressions that true profitability 
in group firms is hidden by extensive use of profit dissipation techniques. 
 
 
5  Sources of benefits of group affiliation 
In this section we provide some evidence on two potential sources of benefits of group af-
filiation in Russia: intragroup risk sharing and preferential treatment from the state (in the 
form of subsidies and toleration of tax arrears), which has received surprisingly little atten-




bor productivity becomes significant, suggesting that it is indeed an important determinant of entry into a 
group. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




5.1  Risk sharing within groups 
One particular function of capital markets that has been associated with business groups is 
the provision of mutual insurance opportunities for member firms. This idea originated in 
the literature on Japanese groups, where several studies suggested that groups provide an 
organizational mechanism through which risks are shared, resulting in smoother measures 
of operating performance (see eg Nakatani (1984) for empirical evidence). Group members 
whose profits are low obtain cheap inputs and other forms of group assistance, so that their 
profitability is not as low as it would otherwise have been. At the same time, group firms 
whose performance is good share some of their good fortune with less successful group 
members. A conventional view of the motivation for such a behavior is that employees and 
managers with firm-specific human capital cannot easily protect themselves against ad-
verse shocks (when capital markets outside of groups are underdeveloped) and so appre-
ciate the risk reduction afforded by intragroup relations (Aoki (1984)). 
Following the empirical strategy to test for risk sharing in business groups sug-
gested by Khanna and Yafeh (2005), we will examine whether members of Russian groups 
have smoother profit rates relative to other firms by estimating the following equation: 
 
i i i i i Controls ROA variables   ownership   and   Group VROA ε γ γ β α + + + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 0
                                                
, (2) 
 
where (VROA) is the standard deviation of the firm’s operating profitability
1415, calculated 
over 1999-2002, the years for which we have data. (Group and ownership variables) stands 
for either the dummy GROUP or a set of dummies for different ownership categories of 
group and independent firms (base category – private independent firms), (ROA) is the 
firm’s operating profitability, return on assets. Other control variables are similar to those 
in equation (1). Upper bars denote individual averages over the period under consideration. 
Since standard deviations of profitability are calculated on the basis of time series of dif-
ferent lengths, equation (2) is estimated using weighted least squares, where we take the 
number of observations per firm as weights. 
 
14 Summary statistics for profit volatility and other variables introduced below in this section are presented in 
Appendix D. 
15 Note that some forms of risk sharing could not always be reflected in smoother operating profitability. For 
instance, internal transfers among group members may enable investment smoothing, which, in some cases, Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




                                                                                                                                                   
Results of our within-group mutual insurance test of are presented in Table 7. 
When all business groups are included (Column 1), the coefficient of the group dummy is 
positive, economically negligible (0.004, compared to the mean standard deviation of op-
erating profitability in the sample of 0.075) and insignificant, thus providing no support for 
the hypothesis of the prevalence of intragroup risk-sharing. After we control for firms’ he-
terogeneity along the ownership dimension (Column 2), not much is changed in the esti-
mates. Again, signs of differences in profit volatility between (foreign, state and private) 
groups and independent firms of corresponding ownership categories are positive, and all 
differences are small in magnitude and far from being statistically distinguishable from ze-
ro. Finally, when we estimate a variant of equation (2) with the volatility of asset growth 
rates taken as the dependent variable (results not reported), we find no evidence of smaller 
volatility for group members. We thus conclude that after the crisis Russian business 
groups did not follow the pattern of the Japanese keiretsu in providing mutual insurance to 
member firms, at least not in the form of smoothing operating performance or asset growth 
rates. Therefore, risk-sharing is unlikely to be a source of benefits of group affiliation in 
post-crisis Russia. Our finding appears to be in line with the previous more general result 
of Shumilov and Volchkova (2004), that the role of capital markets in intragroup relations 
in Russia during the same period, 1999-2002, was at most limited. Note, however, that in-
significance of risk-sharing does not make Russian groups a special case, as a similar pat-
tern was observed for groups in most of the large emerging economies at the end of the 
20th century (Khanna and Yafeh (2005)). 
 
 
5.2  Preferential treatment from the state 
We now ask the question whether preferential treatment from the state could be one of the 
sources of benefits of group affiliation. The common direct forms of preferential treatment 
in the economy are government subsidies, tax breaks and subsidized energy prices (Slinko 
et al (2005)). Implicit state support via tolerated tax arrears is also documented to be a 
widespread phenomenon in Russia (Schaffer (1998)). Definitely, some of these favors are 
non-transparent by nature and cannot be easily measured, but, fortunately, information on 
 
need not lead to smoother profit rates. To explore this possibility, we also estimate a version of equation (2) 
in which the volatility of asset growth rates is taken as a dependent variable. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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valuable components of preferential treatment, subsidies and tax arrears, is present in 
FCSM reports. We, therefore, investigate whether group firms receive relatively more sub-
sidies from the state or obtain indirect state support through larger tax arrears than non-
affiliated firms. 
We start by examining the case of subsidies. Data on the flow of subsidies can be 
found both in Form 3 (equity movement statement) and Form 4 (cash flow statement) of 
FCSM reports. Form 4 reports monetary subsidies, and Form 3 – total amount of subsidies 
received over the year (including eg transfers of equipment). The problem with the latter 
item is, however, that its values are missing in more than 20 percent of observations in our 
regression sample for 1999-2002. The item ‘monetary subsidies’, by contrast, has only 346 
missing values (out of 12,448), so as our working variable for subsidies we choose that 
from Form 4
16. 
Many firms in the sample did not receive subsidies during the period studied (the 
subsidies variable equals zero in 6240 observations). This implies that subsidies are likely 
to be granted in a non-random manner, so that standard regression techniques for analyzing 
the relationship between group affiliation and subsidies would yield biased results. To 
solve this problem, we utilize Heckman’s procedure, which simultaneously estimates the 
probability that a firm is granted a subsidy (selection equation) and the size of the subsidy 
given that it is granted (size equation). In the selection equation, the dependent variable is 
equal to one if a firm receives a subsidy in a particular year, and zero otherwise. In the size 
equation, as regressand we take the natural logarithm of the volume of subsidies divided by 
the firm’s output. This normalization is done to account for considerable size-heterogeneity 
across firms in the sample. The list of explanatory variables in both equations includes 
controls from equation (1), since all of them ex-ante appear to be important determinants 
of state subsidies. We run regressions for the period 1999-2002 (thus time dummies are 
also included in sets of controls), allowing error terms to be correlated across observations 
of a given firm. 
The resulting estimates are reported in Table 8. In the simple specification with 
one dummy for all groups, group affiliation has no statistically significant effect on the 
probability of receiving subsidies. It is, however, strongly negatively correlated with the 
 
16 Replicating regression analysis on the reduced sample using the ‘total subsidies’ variable does not alter the 
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size of subsidies (given that they are granted): group members get 37 percent less 
17 money 
per unit of output from the state than stand-alones. These findings are largely confirmed 
when we introduce different categories of business groups. In the corresponding selection 
equation, the coefficient of the dummy for private groups is insignificant, and F-tests do 
not reject the equality of coefficients in pairs of dummies STATE GROUP and STATE, 
and FOREIGN GROUP and FOREIGN. Thus the probability of receiving subsidies does 
not differ as between groups and stand-alones in the same ownership category. Turning to 
estimates of the size equation, members of private (foreign) groups receive 42 (41) percent 
less subsidies per unit of output than private (foreign) independent firms. Difference in the 
size of subsidies between groups and stand-alones owned by the state is also negative, but 
statistically insignificant. Overall, in both specifications we find no evidence that group 
membership positively affects incidence or size of subsidies. This allows us to infer that 
subsidies as a form of preferential treatment from the state are not a source of benefits of 
group affiliation. Finally, it is interesting to note that other results of subsidies regressions 
are in line with the main findings from previous research on determinants of the allocation 
of subsidies in Russia (Orlov (2000)). Large firms, whose liquidation is costly (both eco-
nomically and politically) for the state, are more likely to receive subsidies. Another me-
chanism for dispensing patronage and maintaining political support for the incumbent poli-
ticians (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)) is state ownership: we observe that both the probabili-
ty of receiving subsidies and the amount of state support are significantly higher for state 
firms than for private ones. 
Let us now consider the case of indirect state support, tax arrears. We define the 
stock of tax arrears as the sum of balance sheet items ‘arrears to the budget’ and ‘arrears to 
extra-budgetary (social security) funds’ for the end of year. Compared to (monetary) sub-
sidies, whose total amount fluctuated around one percent of the sample output throughout 
the observed period, the magnitude of tax arrears in the sample is far larger. In 1998, the 
total amount of tax arrears constituted 19 percent of the sample output. In the first post-
crisis year, 1999, arrears fell sharply to 11 percent of total sample sales and then gradually 
declined to 4 percent in the end of 2002. Tax arrears are zero in less than ½ percent of the 
observations in our panel. Therefore, to analyze the relationship between arrears and group 
membership, we do not correct for selection, and we use the same estimation technique as 
 
17 exp(-0.468)-1=-0.374. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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in the previous section, the between-effects method. Again, we normalize the dependent 
variable, tax arrears, by nominal output due to wide variation of size in the sample. Anoth-
er reason for doing so is to control for the amount of taxes due. While the amount of tax 
obligations is reported only occasionally in supplements to financial statements, the value 
of enterprise output appears to be the closest proxy that is available for all firms. Turning 
to explanatory variables, previous literature (Alfandari and Schaffer (1996), Ponomareva 
and Zhuravskaya (2004)) identified lack of liquidity (financial distress) as a very important 
source of tax arrears. We, therefore, control for the extent of firms’ liquidity problems by 
introducing the logarithm of the current ratio
18 (current assets divided by current liabilities) 
as a right-hand side variable. If liquidity constraints are binding, our liquidity measure is 
expected to be negatively correlated with tax arrears. Other controls used are the same as in 
equation (1). As in the performance analysis, we estimate model specifications in which 
the initial level of the dependent variable is included in a set of covariates. This is done to 
compare cumulative changes in tax arrears between group affiliates and stand-alones. 
Table 9 presents the results of our model regressions. When all groups are consi-
dered as a whole, the level of tax arrears per unit of output in group firms is 18 percent 
lower than that in stand-alones over the observed period, and the cumulative growth in ar-
rears is smaller by 17 percent. Though similarity in these two figures implies that groups 
and stand-alones had the same level of arrears before the Russian crisis, in no case we find 
evidence of a positive relationship between tax arrears and group affiliation. Furthermore, 
contrary to the hypothesis of bigger state support for business groups, the result of a sharp 
post-crisis drop in arrears for group firms compared to independent ones suggests that 
business groups were the target of government actions to increase tax enforcement follow-
ing Putin’s election in 2000 (Desai et al (2007)). When different group categories are in-
troduced, firms from private groups have 18 (17) percent smaller level (growth) of tax ar-
rears per unit of output than private unaffiliated firms, while foreign and state groups do 
not significantly differ the level or growth of arrears from stand-alones of corresponding 
ownership categories. Thus, from both specifications of the arrears equation, we can draw 
the same conclusion as in the case of subsidies: possible benefits of group affiliation after 
the Russian crisis cannot be attributed to such a form of state support as tax arrears. More-
over, we observe that the policy of stricter tax enforcement initiated in 2000 was likely to 
 
18 To mitigate endogeneity problems, we use one-year lagged values of the current ratio. Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




be targeted at private groups, resulting in a sharp decline in their tax arrears. In fact, it is 
lack of liquidity and closeness to the state - not group lobbying or other factors - that turn 
out to be the major sources of the arrears phenomenon (as indicated by the large negative 
and highly significant coefficient of the current ratio and the positive coefficients of dum-
mies for state firms in both level and growth equations). 
 
 
6  Summary of findings and concluding remarks 
In this paper we explore the performance effects of affiliation with business groups in Rus-
sia during 1999-2002. This question is important, because groups control a substantial part 
of the Russian economy. 
OLS regression analysis reveals that group members are substantially more pro-
ductive than independent firms, but their profitability is statistically indistinguishable from 
that of stand-alones. This result of divergence between productivity and profitability in 
group firms is consistent with the expropriation hypothesis that controlling owners of 
groups extract private benefits by siphoning profits out of their members. The extent of 
profit dissipation, however, varies significantly across business groups of different owner-
ship categories. It is negligible in groups controlled by foreign owners, relatively small in 
state groups, and large in private domestic groups. According to our estimate, in the ab-
sence of tunneling, average ROS in members of private groups should have been 4.5 per-
centage points higher than the observed average value of 8 percentage points. The drastic 
difference in the scope of tunneling between domestic private and other groups can be rea-
sonably attributed to both strong incentives for owners of private groups (oligarchs) to 
hedge against the relatively higher risk of possible future expropriation of property and 
close connections of oligarchs to the power structures, which enable them to minimize the 
costs of minority shareholders expropriation and tax evasion. 
Since the results of static performance comparisons between groups and stand-
alones may suffer from the problem of endogeneity of group membership, we attempt to 
address the endogeneity issue by looking at acquisitions of independent firms by business 
groups during the period under consideration. We find that groups tend to acquire better 
performing firms and that, in the short-run, acquisitions do not lead to significant produc-
tivity improvements for new group members, which suggests that estimates of group effect BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




on firm productivity obtained from static comparisons may be biased upward. Unfortunate-
ly, the short time frame of our panel prevents us from analyzing the extent of the possible 
bias, as it may be the case that benefits of group affiliation become apparent only after a 
period of restructuring. As to the short-run effect of group acquisitions on firm profitabili-
ty, it is found to be significantly negative, which confirms our OLS result on tunneling in 
business groups. 
Finally, we examine two potential sources of benefits of membership in business 
groups: mutual insurance among affiliated firms and preferential treatment from the state 
in a form of subsidies and tolerated tax arrears. We find no evidence of their importance 
for group members: during the observed period groups neither had smoother rates of oper-
ating profitability nor did they receive more support from the state than unaffiliated firms. 
Moreover, the result that tax arrears for firms in private groups fell much faster than for 
independent private firms suggests that private groups were likely to be the target of gov-
ernment actions to increase tax enforcement following Putin’s election in 2000. Together 
with findings from previous studies that group firms benefited from more efficient alloca-
tion of capital within groups than in the rest of the economy before the Russian financial 
crisis in 1998 (Perotti and Gelfer (2001)), but not when the economy entered the period of 
sustained growth (Shumilov and Volchkova (2004)), these results seem to support the hy-
pothesis that advantages of group membership decline as the economic and institutional 
environment gradually improves. 
Overall, all our results nicely fit in with the modern view in the literature of the 
role of business groups at different stages of country’s development (Khanna and Yafeh 
(2007)). Groups seem to arise (often with government support) as responses to institutional 
voids and market imperfections, which in the context of a transition economy are especial-
ly severe in the early stage of the transition process. Substituting for inadequate external 
capital, labor and product markets yields substantial efficiency gains for group members. 
At the same time, in an environment with underdeveloped corporate governance and legal 
systems, groups’ dark side clearly manifests itself as well: controlling owners of groups 
expropriate the value of minority shares and the government’s tax revenues. When market 
institutions become more efficient, economic conditions improve, and/or when the gov-
ernment’s approach toward the big business groups undergoes deep changes, both advan-
tages of group affiliation and owners’ ability to extract private benefits begin to deteriorate. 
This often results in dissolution of those groups that are excessively diversified. While our Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




work focuses mostly on the early period of environmental improvements in the economy, 
future research should incorporate data from groups ‘formation’ (1993-1997) and ‘decline’ 
(2003-2006) phases and thus complete the empirical picture of the evolution of costs and 
gains of group affiliation in Russia. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Figure 1  Distribution of sample output and employment by affiliation status 
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Table 2  Performance regressions (No distinction between groups) 
 
Between effects estimation (1999-2002). Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signific-
ance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable  Log(TFP)  Log(labor 
productivity)  ROS  ROA 
Specification  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 






















Initial level of depen-












































































Industry dummies  No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 

























Observations  12486 11880 11880 11880 11880 11880 11880 11880 
Number  of  firms  3715 3628 3628 3628 3628 3628 3628 3628 
R-squared  0.08 0.64 0.41 0.79 0.16 0.46 0.18 0.49 Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




Table 3  Performance regressions (Different categories of groups) 
 
Between effects estimation (1999-2002). Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signific-
ance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable  Log(TFP)  Log(labor 
productivity)  ROS  ROA 
Specification  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 









































































































Initial level of 













































































Industry dummies  No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
























Observations  12448 11880 11880 11880 11880 11880 11880 11880 
Number  of  firms  3715 3628 3628 3628 3628 3628 3628 3628 
R-squared  0.10 0.65 0.45 0.80 0.18 0.46 0.19 0.49 
P-values          
Private group= 
=State group  0.109 0.742 0.143 0.322 0.403 0.216 0.658 0.307 
Private group= 
=Foreign group  0.000 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 
State group= 
=State control  0.000 0.025 0.018 0.916 0.479 0.584 0.530 0.876 
Foreign group= 
=Foreign control  0.571 0.950 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.072 0.178 
 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Table 4  Effects of joining groups 
Fixed effects regressions (1998-2002). Time dummies are included in all regressions, but their coefficients 




Dependent variable  Log(labor productivity)  ROS  ROA 
Independent Variable     


















Observations  3715 3715 3715 
Number of firms  15629  15629  15629 
R-squared  0.01 0.03 0.01 
 
 
Panel B. Dummy GROUP=0 in year of joining group 
Dependent variable  Log(labor productivity)  ROS  ROA 
Independent Variable     


















Observations  3715 3715 3715 
Number of firms  15629  15629  15629 




Dependent variable  Log(labor productivity)  ROS  ROA 
Independent Variable     


















Observations  3715 3715 3715 
Number of firms  15629  15629  15629 
R-squared  0.01 0.03 0.01 Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




Table 5  Probability of being acquired by a group 
 
Probit model. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm becomes a group (private group) member in year t. 
All existing group affiliates (those firms that were group members for the whole period 1998-2002 as well as 
new members before and after the time of joining groups were removed from the sample. The estimation 
sample includes all firm-years (1999-2001) with performance indicators (labor productivity, ROA, ROS) 
available for years t, (t+1) and non-missing data in year (t-1) for any of the variables listed. Industry, regional 
and year dummies are included in regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 
 
Variable GROUP  PRIVATE GROUP 
















Observations 5222  4665 





Table 6  Average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) 
 
Nearest neighbor matching (with replacement). 
 
Panel A. Acquisitions by groups as a whole 
Number of treated: 94. Number of controls: 90. 
 
  Log(labor produc-
tivity) 
ROS ROA 














Panel B. Acquisitions by private groups 
Number of treated: 77. Number of controls: 69. 
 
  Log(labor produc-
tivity) 
ROS ROA 











[0.022]* BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Table 7  Risk sharing and operating profitability 
 
Between-effects estimation (1999-2002). Dependent variable is the standard deviation of operating profitabil-
ity (ROA). Firms with ROA above 1 or below -1 are excluded from the analysis. Industry and regional dum-
mies are included in each regression, but their coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors in brack-
ets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Variable    
GROUP  0.0041 
[0.0033]   
PRIVATE GROUP    0.0048 
[0.0040] 
STATE GROUP    -0.0085 
[0.0059] 
FOREIGN GROUP    0.0133 
[0.0088] 
STATE   -0.0047 
[0.0033] 
FOREIGN   0.0088 
[0.0070] 






















Observations 12106  12106 
Number of firms  3450  3450 
R-squared 0.26  0.26 
P-values    
Private group=State group    0.044 
Private group=Foreign group    0.376 
State group=State control    0.556 
Foreign group=Foreign control    0.686 Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




Table 8  Subsidies regressions 
 
Heckman’s estimation procedure (1999-2002). In selection equation, dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
firm receives a subsidy in a particular year, 0 otherwise. In size equation, dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of subsidies normalized by output. Industry, regional and time dummies are included in each re-
gression, but their coefficients are not reported. Standard errors, adjusted for clustering at firm level, in 
brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
  Selection equation  Size equation 
Variable       
GROUP  -0.053 
[0.066]    -0.468 
[0.167]***   
PRIVATE GROUP    -0.076 
[0.078]    -0.540 
[0.176]*** 
STATE GROUP    0.322 
[0.127]**    0.605 
[0.334]* 
FOREIGN GROUP    -0.248 
[0.169]    -1.007 
[0.690] 
STATE   0.166 
[0.061]***    0.824 
[0.167]*** 
FOREIGN   -0.138 
[0.107]    -0.486 
[0.334] 




































Observations 12100  12100     
Uncensored observations 
(Subsidies>0)  5860 5860 5860  5860 
P-values       
Private group = State group  0.003    0.001 
Private group = Foreign group  0.347    0.508 
State group = State control  0.247    0.546 
Foreign group = Foreign control  0.575    0.492 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




Table 9  Tax arrears regressions 
 
Between-effects estimation (1999-2002). Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of tax arrears norma-
lized by output. Industry and regional dummies are included in each regression, but their coefficients are not 
reported. Standard errors in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respec-
tively. 
 
Specification  1 1 2 2 
Variable      
GROUP  -0.194 
[0.072]***    -0.189 
[0.049]***   
PRIVATE GROUP    -0.189 
[0.078]**    -0.193 
[0.057]*** 
STATE GROUP    0.385 
[0.157]***    0.140 
[0.093] 
FOREIGN GROUP    -0.457 
[0.183]*** 
  -0.365 
[0.117]*** 
STATE   0.599 
[0.075]***    0.233 
[0.051]*** 
FOREIGN   -0.680 
[0.129]***    -0.234 
[0.095]** 
















































Observations  11760 11760 11760 11760 
Number of firms  3616  3616  3616  3616 
R-squared 0.50  0.52  0.75  0.75 
P-values      
Private group = State group  0.000    0.001 
Private group = Foreign group  0.171    0.175 
State group = State control  0.223    0.357 
Foreign group = Foreign control  0.316    0.381 Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




Appendix A. Data cleaning procedures 
 
 
The FCSM data are rich both in the number of large and medium-size firms covered and in 
financial variables. However, substantial cleaning was required to achieve a good quality 
database. The major problems we encountered while checking the data were the following: 
incorrect industry codes; inconsistencies between measurement units of different financial 
statements within the same report; inconsistencies between measurement units of neighbor-
ing observations in individual time-series; misplaced columns ‘for the current year’ and 
‘for the preceding year’ in income statements; wrong arithmetical signs of items in income 
statements (eg costs cannot be negative). 
We automated the cleaning process by using correcting programs that compared 
control figures in different reports in individual series (sales, total assets and industry 
codes), in balance sheets and income statements (item ‘undistributed profit/loss for the cur-
rent period’ is present in both statements), and within income statements (profit/loss is a 
linear combination of several items). Questionable cases that could not be resolved auto-
matically (such as a big difference in sales and/or total assets before and after some date, 
non-existing industry codes, etc) were then corrected manually. We also made every effort 
to check whether missing values of variables of interest (profits, tax arrears, subsidies) in 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Andrei Shumilov  Performance of business groups:  




                                                
Appendix C. Sample representativeness 
Firms in the resulting sample constitute a substantial part of the Russian industry. As Table 
C1 reports, in the first year, 1998, they accounted for 40 percent of the total number of em-
ployees in the industry and over 53 percent of total industrial output. Corresponding fig-
ures for other years are only slightly lower than for 1998. Nor does the number of observa-
tions (maximum is 3332 in 1999) vary much over the years. Some decrease in firms’ cov-
erage between 2001 and 2002 is due to technical problems in switching to a different for-
mat of enterprise reports in 2003. The majority of firms in the sample with missing 2002 
data continued disclosure reporting in consecutive years (and we distinguish them from 
companies that discontinued reporting). Moreover, the proportion of group firms in the set 
of dropped enterprises is almost the same as in the whole sample. It is thus unlikely that 
selection bias issues associated with smaller number of observations in the end of the panel 
are a major source of concern. 
Figure C1 presents distributions of firms in the sample and in the total industrial 
population by sectors in 2001. Since we do not consider very small firms in our study, 
sample distribution, compared to that of the whole industry, should be expected to be bi-
ased towards sectors with higher average firm size. Indeed, as seen from the Figure, sectors 
with the highest average firm employment (electricity, fuel industry, and metallurgy) are 
overrepresented in the sample, while sectors with the smallest firm size (timber and paper, 
and light industry) are underrepresented. 
Because the contribution of small firms to total industrial output is small, the sam-
ple distribution of output across sectors should be similar to that of the industry as a whole. 
These distributions are shown in Figure C2. As expected, in terms of output shares, all sec-
tors are quite adequately represented in the sample as compared to the population of manu-
facturing firms, though a slight bias towards more concentrated industries remains.
19 
Finally, we compare the regional structure of the sample with that of the total popu-
lation. Figure C3 shows the distributions of firms by federal district. Shares of five of sev-
en districts in the sample are similar to the population figures. The share of the North-
Western district is smaller than in the population, whereas the Volga district is overrepre-
sented in the sample. These discrepancies can be in large part explained by the fact that 
relatively few big firms are located in the North-Western district, and there are relatively 
more large and upper medium size firms in Volga region (‘1000 Best Russian Enterprises’, 
2003). Indeed, if we look at the regional distribution of output (Figure C4), five districts 
remain to be adequately represented in the sample, the difference in the sample and popu-
lation shares for North-Western district almost disappears, and the corresponding differ-
ence for Volga district becomes less pronounced. 
 
19 As to distribution of employment by sector, Rosstat provides statistics only on ‘industrial employment’ 
(promyshlenno-proizvodstvenny personal). This indicator differs from ‘total firm employment’ in our data-
base. As a rough check, we compared distributions of these two measures by sectors. The resulting picture is 
similar to the case of the distribution of output across industries. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




A similar picture evolves when we compare our sample with the total population in 
other years (corresponding statistics are not reported, to save space). We can thus conclude 
that the sample is reasonably representative of the universe of large and medium size Rus-




Table C1  Sample coverage 
 
Total sample employment and output, percent of Russian industry 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of observations  3143 3332 3305 3098 2751 
Employment  40.0 39.6 39.5 39.6 36.7 
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Table D1  Summary statistics for variables used in Section 4 
 
Based on maximum-size sample in regressions. 
 
 Observations  Mean  Median  St.dev.  Min  Max 
Standard deviation of ROA  3450  0.075 0.058 0.064 0.000 0.459 
ROA  12106  0.120 0.081 0.159  -0.807 0.897 
Log(Employment)  12448  6.629 6.525 1.185 3.401  11.711 
Log(Subsidies/Sales) 5860  -7.017  -6.989 2.738  -15.365 3.291 
Log(Tax Arrears/Sales)  12352  -2.921 -3.107  1.671 -9.932  4.308 
Log(Current  ratio)  12352  0.201 0.150 0.724  -3.193 3.890 
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